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I.

FOUNDING PRINCIPLES OF THE JUVENILE COURT

Juvenile court was created to address the differences between
adults and children. The juvenile justice system focused more on
1
rehabilitating children, rather than punishing them. To achieve
this goal, judges in juvenile court were granted discretion to
consider an individual child’s development and social and
psychological situation when designing the response best
2
calculated to correct that child’s behavior and address its causes.
Juvenile court founders believed that there was a greater
† Lisa McNaughton is the Managing Attorney for Juvenile Court in the
Hennepin County–Fourth Judicial District Public Defenders’ Office. She is a
graduate of William Mitchell College of Law where she served on the editorial
board of the William Mitchell Law Review. The author was assisted in the creation of
this article by Elizabeth Dilks. Elizabeth is in her final year at the University of
Minnesota Law School and is employed as a law clerk in the Public Defenders’
Office.
1. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1967) (noting that the idealistic
reformists who conceived of the juvenile system believed that “[t]he child was to
be ‘treated’ and ‘rehabilitated’ and the procedures, from apprehension through
institutionalization, were to be ‘clinical’ rather than punitive”); Julian W. Mack,
The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 107 (1909); Lisa Ells, Note, Juvenile
Psychopathy: The Hollow Promise of Prediction, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 158, 160 (2005).
2. Ells, supra note 1, at 160-61; see MARTIN L. FORST, THE NEW JUVENILE
JUSTICE 1, 2 (1995).
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opportunity to rehabilitate children and that children should not
be punished for their actions in the same manner as adults because
3
they were less blameworthy than adults. This belief existed since at
4
least the seventeenth century. English common law provided an
infancy defense for children under the age of seven and a
rebuttable presumption of irresponsibility for youths under the age
5
of fourteen. At the same time, however, the treatment of juveniles
6
was harsh and devoid of procedural protections. By the time the
7
first juvenile court was established in 1899, reducing the harsh
treatment of juveniles, studies in the emerging science of child
development supported the idea that juveniles are less culpable for
8
their actions than adults. Rather than treating similarly situated
juveniles alike, the juvenile system’s founders aimed to consider
each child as an individual and to tailor a treatment plan to his or
her needs with the goal of breaking the cycle of crime before it set
in.
It became clear by the mid-1960s that state juvenile systems fell
9
short of these goals. Juvenile courts were unable to offer sufficient
individualized treatment to each child due to their heavy
10
caseloads and budget shortfalls. Instead, most juvenile treatment
facilities were factory-like and failed to provide follow-up treatment
11
to prevent recidivism because purely punitive solutions were
easier to apply. Juvenile courts offered few procedural safeguards
3. See Ells, supra note 1, at 162; Eric K. Klein, Note, Dennis The Menace or Billy
The Kid: An Analysis of the Role of Transfer to Criminal Court in Juvenile Justice, 35 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 371, 375 (1998) (stating that the reforms leading to a separate court
for juveniles “stemmed from a belief that children should not be held to the same
level of accountability as adults because they were not fully responsible for their
actions”).
4. Klein, supra note 3, at 375.
5. Id.
6. See Randall G. Shelden & Michelle Hussong, Juvenile Crime, Adult
Adjudication and the Death Penalty: Draconian Policies Revisited, JUST. POL’Y J., Spring
2003, at 1, 7, http://www.cjcj.org/pdf/shelden_hussong.pdf (describing the
treatment of child offenders in early U.S. jurisprudence).
7. Mack, supra note 1, at 107; Ells, supra note 1, at 160.
8. Ells, supra note 1, at 162; David S. Tanenhaus, The Evolution of Transfer out
of the Juvenile Court, in THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 13, 17 (Jeffrey
Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring eds., 2000).
9. C. Antoinette Clarke, The Baby and the Bathwater: Adolescent Offending and
Punitive Juvenile Justice Reform, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 659, 669 (2005).
10. Id.; see Jennifer M. O’Connor & Lucinda K. Treat, Getting Smart About
Getting Tough: Juvenile Justice and the Possibility of Progressive Reform, 33 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1299, 1303 (1996).
11. Clarke, supra note 9, at 669; O’Connor & Treat, supra note 10, at 1303.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol32/iss3/7

2

McNaughton: Extending Roper's Reasoning to Minnesota's Juvenile Justice Syste
10MCNAUGHTON.DOC

2006]

4/5/2006 1:33:03 PM

EXTENDING ROPER’S REASONING TO MINNESOTA

1065

to assure that guilt was clearly established before consequences
were imposed.
In response to the juvenile system’s failure to meet its
rehabilitative ideals and the limited procedural protections
afforded the accused, the U.S. Supreme Court stepped in and
mandated that youthful offenders in the juvenile system received
increased constitutional protections. During the mid-1960s, the
Court heard several cases in which it declared that juveniles were
entitled to some of the same due process procedural safeguards as
12
adults. Critics argue that these due process reforms transformed
the juvenile system into a “scaled-down, second-class criminal court
13
for young people” because the courts became more adversarial
14
and formalistic in nature.
While juvenile court may have come to share some procedures
and safeguards with adult criminal court since the 1960s, the
rehabilitative goal remained a key component of the adjudication
phase of juvenile court. This goal, however, faced increasing
obstacles posed by state legislators who approached juveniles
punitively, fueled by a short-term rise in juvenile crime and media
fascination with more disturbing, albeit isolated, cases.
In response to the rise in violent juvenile crime between 1965
and the early 1990s, most notably between 1987 and 1991,
legislatures developed a more punitive approach, with little
15
discretion available, to addressing juvenile offenders. This change
was driven not only by the media’s sensationalist coverage of
16
disturbing violent juvenile crimes, such as school shootings, but
also by a political shift toward harsher punishments. Despite the
fact that the nationwide rate of violent juvenile crime has
17
plummeted by 71% since 1993, legislators continue to propose
bills which subject juveniles to unduly harsh punishments. There
are existing statutes that punish juveniles automatically and severely
12. Clarke, supra note 9, at 669-70; Wright S. Walling & Stacia Walling Driver,
100 Years of Juvenile Court in Minnesota—A Historical Overview and Perspective, 32 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 883, 902-04 (2006); see In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
13. BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUVENILE
COURT 287 (1999).
14. Clarke, supra note 9, at 673.
15. Id. at 674.
16. Id. at 674-75.
17. FORUM ON FAMILY & CHILD STATISTICS, YOUTH VICTIMS AND PERPETRATORS
OF SERIOUS VIOLENT CRIME (2005), http://www.childstats.gov/americaschildren/
beh4.asp.
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despite the fact that the juvenile violent crime rate has fallen. Such
statutes not only fail to consider the purposes of the juvenile
system, but they also expose juveniles to sentences that are not
proportionate to their diminished culpability. These statutes exist
despite the fact that the science of brain development has provided
further clarification that juvenile brains, particularly in teenage
years, are still in developmental flux and not necessarily indicative
18
of adult behavior. With these more punitive changes, efforts to
redirect children to more useful lives are abandoned and the use of
expensive and lengthy incarcerations is mandated.
II. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT RECOGNIZES JUVENILES’ DIMINISHED
CULPABILITY IN ROPER V. SIMMONS
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution
19
prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. The Supreme Court has
implemented this concept by applying a comparison between
culpability and punishment.
The Eighth Amendment
proportionality analysis requires an examination not only of a
crime’s gravity, but also of a defendant’s culpability. The U.S.
Supreme Court explained that the Eighth Amendment guarantees
individuals the right not to be subjected to excessive sanctions in
20
proportion to their culpability. In Atkins v. Virginia, the Court
held that subjecting mentally retarded adults to the death penalty
violated the Eighth Amendment because such adults were less
21
culpable for their actions than the average adult offender.
In 2005, the Supreme Court applied Atkins’s reasoning when
declaring it unconstitutional to subject juveniles to the death
22
penalty in Roper v. Simmons.
Framing its Eighth Amendment
proportionality analysis, the court in Roper referred to “‘the
18. See Joel V. Oberstar, Elise M. Anderson & Jonathan B. Jensen, Cognative
and Moral Development, Brain Development, and Mental Illness: Important Considerations
for the Juvenile Justice System, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1051 (2006); Laurence
Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental
Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 1009 (2003); see also Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg,
(Im)maturity of Judgment in Adolescence: Why Adolescents May Be Less Culpable than
Adults, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 741, 756 (2000); Thomas Grisso et al., Juveniles’
Competence to Stand Trial: A Comparison of Adolescents’ and Adults’ Capacities as Trial
Defendants, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 333, 335 (2003).
19. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
20. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002).
21. Id. at 319.
22. Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol32/iss3/7

4

McNaughton: Extending Roper's Reasoning to Minnesota's Juvenile Justice Syste
10MCNAUGHTON.DOC

2006]

4/5/2006 1:33:03 PM

EXTENDING ROPER’S REASONING TO MINNESOTA

1067

evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society’ to determine which punishments are so disproportionate as
23
to be cruel and unusual.” By evaluating recent sociological and
scientific data, the Court cited three fundamental differences
between juveniles and adults that rendered juveniles less culpable
24
for their actions. First, youth tend to possess “‘[a] lack of maturity
and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility . . . [which] result in
25
Second,
impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions.’”
juveniles are “more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences
26
and outside pressures, including peer pressure.”
Finally, a
27
juvenile’s character is “not as well formed as that of an adult.”
Rather, juveniles’ personality traits are “more transitory” and “less
28
fixed” than those of adults.
Based on these differences, the Supreme Court in Roper
concluded that juveniles’ irresponsible conduct was less morally
29
reprehensible than that of adults.
In addition, the fact that a
majority of states had rejected the juvenile death penalty provided
“sufficient evidence [to the Court] that today our society views
juveniles . . . as ‘categorically less culpable than the average
30
criminal.’”
The Court declared the death penalty to be a
disproportionate punishment for all juvenile offenders under the
age of eighteen because juveniles’ “culpability or blameworthiness
is diminished, to a substantial degree, by reason of youth and
31
immaturity.” Due to the “marked” differences between juvenile
and adult offenders, the Court found that juveniles should be
32
subjected to less severe sentences than adults for the same crimes.
Though the holding in Roper only addressed capital
punishment of juveniles, the Supreme Court has noted that the
Eighth Amendment proportionality principle also applies to
33
noncapital sentences. Thus, Roper’s rationale should be applied to
any situation in which juveniles are subjected to harsh punishments
23. Id. at 1190 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-101 (1958)).
24. Id. at 1195.
25. Id. (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1186 (citing Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988)).
30. Id. at 1194 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002)).
31. Id. at 1196.
32. Id. at 1197.
33. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 997-98 (1991) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
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that are disproportionate to the juveniles’ levels of culpability.
III. AUTOMATIC CERTIFICATION IN MINNESOTA
A juvenile over the age of sixteen could always be certified and
tried as an adult if the evidence revealed that this was the proper
34
path. Now, however, a juvenile must be certified as an adult if
35
In Minnesota, there are several
charged with certain offenses.
situations in which a juvenile is automatically subjected to
sentences that are just as severe as that of an adult without taking
his or her diminished culpability into account. For instance,
Minnesota Statutes section 260B.007, subdivision 6(b) explicitly
excludes “a child alleged to have committed murder in the first
degree after becoming 16 years of age” from its definition of a
36
“delinquent child.”
Furthermore, Minnesota Statutes section
609.055, subdivision 2(b) automatically certifies “a child who is
alleged to have committed murder in the first degree after
becoming 16 years of age” to be prosecuted as an adult in district
37
court.
Under these statutes, once a juvenile aged sixteen or
seventeen is accused of first-degree murder and indicted by a grand
jury, he or she is automatically subject to adult court’s jurisdiction
without a hearing in juvenile court and is thus treated identically to
38
an adult.
This rule gives rise to two problems. First, the child, without
any examination of his or her maturity or the complexity of the
surrounding circumstances, is treated as an adult. Second, this
determination is made based on the allegation, not the ultimate
39
finding as to what the crime truly was. Picture a real-life situation
in which these two statutes apply: A sixteen-year-old is accused of
first-degree murder. He is indicted by a grand jury, which finds
that probable cause supports this charge. Without a hearing, he
goes to trial in adult court. The jury finds him not guilty of the
original charge that caused him to be deemed an adult, but guilty
of a lesser charge of manslaughter, which would not automatically
have sent him to adult court. Since he has been tried in adult
court, he is subjected to adult punishment, which includes
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

See MINN. STAT. § 260B.125 (1998); MINN. R. JUV. DEL. P. 18.02.
See, e.g., MINN. STAT. §§ 609.055, subd. 2(b), 260B.007, subd. 6(b) (2004).
Id. § 260B.007, subd. 6(b).
Id. § 609.055, subd. 2(b).
Id. §§ 260B.007, subd. 6(b), 609.055, subd. 2(b).
Id. § 260B.007, subd. 6(b).
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incarceration in prison with adults and an adult conviction on his
record.
By contrast, a sixteen-year-old who was correctly charged with
manslaughter to begin with, absent a showing that he should be
40
certified as an adult or given Extended Jurisdiction Juvenile
41
42
status, would be subject to a juvenile court’s jurisdiction. Once
he has been tried in juvenile court and found guilty of
manslaughter, the judge sentences him to a punishment that is
calculated to maximize the chances that the unlawful behavior will
stop. If incarceration is appropriate, he will be detained in juvenile
facilities and will receive treatment in programs designated for
juveniles. His adjudication will not go on his record permanently;
rather, it will be treated as a juvenile adjudication.
When comparing the different fates of these two similarly
situated juveniles, the flaw in the automatic certification statutes is
apparent. These statutes subject certain juveniles to much harsher
penalties than other similarly situated juveniles merely for what
they were charged with, rather than for what they actually did.
IV. THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT POSITION PRIOR TO ROPER
AND ATKINS
In State v. Behl, the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld one of
43
44
these automatic certification statutes as constitutional.
The
statute automatically waives the juvenile court’s jurisdiction over
juveniles sixteen and seventeen years old who have been indicted
45
for first-degree murder.
The Atkins and Roper rationale calls the Minnesota Supreme
Court’s holding in State v. Behl into question. The Minnesota
46
Supreme Court decided Behl five years before Atkins and eight
47
years before Roper, which the U.S. Supreme Court decided in
2005. The court’s reasoning in Behl fails to consider juveniles’
diminished culpability as a factor in its proportionality analysis, as
48
the Supreme Court declared was necessary in Roper. Instead, the
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

See id. § 260B.125.
See id. § 260B.130.
See id. § 260B.101, subd. 1.
Id. § 260.015 (repealed 1999) (current version at § 260B.007 (2004)).
State v. Behl, 564 N.W.2d 560, 567-68 (Minn. 1997).
MINN. STAT. § 260.015 (1998).
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002).
Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005).
Id. at 1186.
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court in Behl based its holding on the idea that “juveniles over the
age of 16 who have undertaken conduct sufficient to invoke an
indictment for first-degree murder, are more dangerous and less
49
amenable to the treatment provided by the juvenile system.”
Obviously, in some cases this is true, but the ordinary
certification process would find such juveniles in adult court
anyway. Often, however, it is not true. The “automatic” nature of
the rule conflicts with the U.S. Supreme Court’s reasoning in Roper,
for it merely considers the seriousness of the crime with which the
juvenile is charged, while neglecting to take the three fundamental
cognitive differences between juveniles and adults into account. In
Behl, the Minnesota Supreme Court allowed the legislature to usurp
what was traditionally the court’s authority, taking the nowdiscredited approach of allowing automatic certification to replace
50
individualized decision making.
There is no denying the gravity of first-degree murder
allegations. However, a juvenile accused of this crime should not
be subjected to automatic certification in adult court. Instead, such
a juvenile should be entitled to the juvenile court’s individualized
determination of whether adult or juvenile court is the appropriate
venue. This may often result in the juvenile being certified to adult
court because past or present behavior reveals it to be the
appropriate response, but that will not always be the case.
In a recent case, the Arizona Supreme Court held that an
Arizona automatic filing scheme violated the Eighth Amendment
51
on the same proportionality ground explained in Roper. Like the
Minnesota statute at issue in Behl, the Arizona scheme automatically
subjected a juvenile to adult court jurisdiction when he or she was
52
accused of first-degree murder.
The Arizona court cited an
53
earlier U.S. Supreme Court decision, Stanford v. Kentucky, which
had allowed juvenile certification because of the fact that those
states’ juvenile courts had conducted individualized consideration
of each juvenile’s maturity and moral responsibility as a
54
precondition to transfer to adult court.
Similar to the unconstitutional Arizona statute, Minnesota

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Behl, 564 N.W.2d at 568.
See id.
State v. Davolt, 84 P.3d 456, 480-81 (Ariz. 2004).
Id. at 879.
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
Davolt, 84 P.3d at 480 (citing Stanford, 492 U.S. at 375-76).
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Statutes sections 260B.007 and 609.055 automatically certify a
juvenile as an adult once he or she is accused of first-degree
55
murder.
In light of the recent decisions of the U.S. Supreme
Court, as well as other courts, it seems likely that Minnesota courts
will declare these statutes unconstitutional if they are not changed,
for they automatically subject juveniles to punishments potentially
disproportionate to their culpability without the opportunity for a
certification hearing in juvenile court.
A juvenile court is uniquely situated to determine whether a
juvenile has sufficient culpability, when considering all relevant
factors, to be certified as an adult. In Minnesota, juvenile courts
routinely evaluate several factors in making this decision including:
(A) the seriousness of the alleged offense in terms of
community protection, including the existence of any
aggravating factors recognized by the Minnesota
Sentencing Guidelines, the use of a firearm, and the
impact on any victim;
(B) the culpability of the child in committing the alleged
offense, including the level of the child’s participation in
planning and carrying out the offense and the existence
of any mitigating factors recognized by the Minnesota
Sentencing Guidelines;
(C) the child’s prior record of delinquency;
(D) the child’s programming history, including the child’s
past willingness to participate meaningfully in available
programming;
(E) the adequacy of the punishment or programming
available in the juvenile justice system;
56
(F) the dispositional options available for the child.
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the juvenile court’s
expertise in deciding whether a juvenile should be subjected to
57
adult court’s jurisdiction. In Kent v. United States, the Court ruled
that a juvenile is entitled to due process and fair treatment in any
58
hearing, including a hearing for transfer to adult court.
According to the Supreme Court in Kent, a juvenile is entitled to a
hearing in which the juvenile court considers his or her special

55.
56.
57.
58.

MINN. STAT. §§ 260B.007, subd. 6(b), 609.055, subd. 2(b) (2004).
MINN. R. JUV. DEL. P. 18.06, subd. 3.
See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 564 (1966).
Id. at 562.
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needs and the individual circumstances of his or her alleged crime
on a case-by-case basis in order to preserve his or her due process
59
rights. Because Minnesota’s automatic certification statutes deny
juveniles any hearing whatsoever, these statutes deny juveniles due
process, as well as subject them to unduly harsh punishments in
adult court. In light of these cases and the legal concepts they
explain, Minnesota’s highest court should declare the automatic
treatment unconstitutional.
V. SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION
When juveniles are accused of any of a wide variety of sex
offenses, they face another scenario in which they are treated as
adults and are thereby disproportionately punished. Minnesota’s
sex offender registration law requires juveniles accused of or
adjudicated delinquent for any level of sex offense to register as sex
offenders. Minnesota Statutes section 243.166 requires a person to
register if “the person was charged with or petitioned for a felony
violation of or attempt to violate any [degree of criminal sexual
conduct] and convicted of or adjudicated delinquent for that offense or
60
another offense arising out of the same set of circumstances.”
Picture another scenario: At his belated sixteenth birthday
party, a sixteen-year-old male and a thirteen-year-old female kiss.
She lifts her shirt and he brushes against her breasts. Her incensed
parent reports this to the police. The police come to the party and
arrest him for fourth degree sexual conduct. When they attempt to
put him in handcuffs, he resists, yelling that he does not want to go
to jail. He is charged with disorderly conduct in addition to the
first offense. In juvenile court, the sixteen-year-old pleads guilty to
disorderly conduct, and is adjudicated delinquent for that offense,
but not for the charge of criminal sexual conduct. However, his
probation officer tells him that he must register as a sex offender
for the next ten years because he was convicted of an offense
arising from the same circumstances as the charge of fourth degree
criminal sexual conduct. In response, he diligently registers with
the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension. Several years later, he
59. Id. at 554-55.
60. MINN. STAT. § 243.166, subd. 1(b)(1) (emphasis added). The statute
provides that the person “required to register under this section shall continue to
comply with this section until ten years have elapsed since the person initially
registered in connection with the offense, or until the probation, supervised
release, or conditional release period expires, whichever occurs later.” Id. subd. 6.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol32/iss3/7

10

McNaughton: Extending Roper's Reasoning to Minnesota's Juvenile Justice Syste
10MCNAUGHTON.DOC

2006]

4/5/2006 1:33:03 PM

EXTENDING ROPER’S REASONING TO MINNESOTA

1073

forgets to register. He then receives a court summons to answer to
a felony charge of failure to register.
This young man’s behavior certainly did not pose a danger to
the public like the violent sex crimes that the Minnesota
Legislature envisioned when it passed the registration statute. His
behavior was worthy of scolding from a parent and, at worst, a
juvenile court intervention. This behavior did not deviate sharply
from normative, exploratory sexual behavior for many people his
age who have no criminal propensity. This person, however, will
suffer the long-term consequences of being a registered sex
offender.
Sex offenders suffer grave collateral consequences due to this
registration requirement. Like many other states, Minnesota’s
registration statute sweeps broadly by including juveniles who have
committed relatively minor offenses.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is important to remember that when addressing the unique
social, physiological, and brain development realities of juveniles,
61
deterrence, justice, and public safety must be “pursued through
means that are fair and just, that recognize the unique
characteristics and needs of children, and that give children access
62
to opportunities for personal and social growth.” This serves the
long-term interests of public safety, fairness, and the sensible
administration of justice.

61. “The purpose of the laws relating to children alleged or adjudicated to be
delinquent is to promote the public safety and reduce juvenile delinquency by
maintaining the integrity of the substantive law prohibiting certain behavior and
by developing individual responsibility for lawful behavior.”
MINN. STAT.
§ 260B.001, subd. 2.
62. Id.
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